1

Download App

Download app
Setup instructions
  1. Step 1: Download the app. Download step illustration
  2. Step 2: Install it on your device (you may need to allow the installation of "unknown apps", first). Install step illustration
  3. Step 3: Open the app (you may need to allow it to use the camer, first). Demo app illustration
  4. Step 4: Return to this website to either scan the QR-code, or tap "Open in wallet app".
2

Prove your age

Try our demo
How it works
  1. Step 1: Initiate: Start the verification process in the web interface. Web interface illustration
  2. Step 2: Verify: Your phone app securely verifies your age. If you opened this webpage on a PC, scan the QR-code, if you opened it on the same phone, tap "Open in wallet app".
  3. Step 3: Complete: Return to complete your registration.

Reading Materials and Source Code

Our app is a demo implementation of anonymous age proofs, using an BBS-based anonymous credentials in the commit-and-prove paradigm with Pedersen commitments, following the approach described in Vision: A Modular Framework for Anonymous Credential Systems and using ECDSA device binding. The range proof for the validity period is implemented using Bulletproofs++. Revocation is implemented using the signed-pairs approach (instantiated with BBS+ 23 and Bulletproofs++), as described in ePrint 2026/1824.

You can obtain the source code for our app here.

Vision: A Modular Framework for Anonymous Credential Systems

ePrint 2025/1981

This work discusses how to modularize the cryptographic protocols for anonymous credentials, such that the standardized components can be used outside of the EUDI context, too. For the EUDI wallet context, a particular focus is on a modular solution for device binding of BBS credentials to legacy phones, that only support ECDSA-signatures.

Device Binding for Anonymous Credentials on Legacy Phones

Deployment of anonymous credentials in the EUDI Wallet is limited by smartphones' secure hardware that only supports legacy algoithms such as ECDSA, not the cryptography required by native device binding for anonymous credentials. We bridge this gap by proving possession of an ECDSA signature under a committed device key, enabling integration with modern anonymous credentials. We compare several approaches regarding implementation simplicity, standards compatibility, and efficiency.

About us

We are a research group focused on cryptography and privacy-preserving technologies.